OPINION OF A SCHOLAR -- Miranda v. Arizona -- Is it Worth the Cost? (A Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort by Inbau, Fred E. & Manak, James P.
California Western Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 1 Article 10 
1987 
OPINION OF A SCHOLAR -- Miranda v. Arizona -- Is it Worth the 
Cost? (A Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of 
Court Time and Effort 
Fred E. Inbau 
James P. Manak 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Inbau, Fred E. and Manak, James P. (1987) "OPINION OF A SCHOLAR -- Miranda v. Arizona -- Is it Worth 
the Cost? (A Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the Expenditure of Court Time and Effort," California 
Western Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 10. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
THE OPINION OF A SCHOLAR
Miranda v. Arizona-Is it Worth the Cost? (A
Sample Survey, with Commentary, of the
Expenditure of Court Time and Effort)
FRED E. INBAU*
JAMES P. MANAK**
INTRODUCTION
On June 13, 1966, the Supreme Court of the United States, in
a five to four decision in Miranda v. Arizona,1 established a re-
quirement that before anyone in police custody may be interro-
gated, the interrogator must advise the suspect that: 1) he has a
right to remain silent; 2) anything he says may be used against
him; 3) he has a right to a lawyer; and 4) if he cannot afford a
lawyer one will be provided free. Only after a "knowing and intel-
ligent" waiver of those rights could the interrogation proceed.
Moreover, if at any time thereafter the suspect decides he no
longer wants to talk, or if he says he wants a lawyer, the interro-
gation must cease. The Court also added that any statements
made without warnings or a waiver are not admissible as evidence.
Miranda was the product of the Warren Court's pursuit of its
egalitarian philosophy. The rationale was that the rich, the edu-
cated, and the intelligent person who is taken into police custody
very probably knows from the outset that he has the privilege of
silence, whereas the poor, the uneducated, or the unintelligent sus-
pect is unaware of the privilege. Consequently, in fairness to all,
every custodial suspect must be advised of the right to silence.
Moreover, in order to ensure that such suspects become fully
aware of that right, they should also be told that they are entitled
to have a lawyer present. Contrary to the generally prevailing im-
pression, even within the legal profession itself, the Court's pre-
* John Henry Wigmore Professor of Law Emeritus, Northwestern University;
Chairman of the Board, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement; and the first Director
of the Chicago Police Scientific Crime Detection Laboratory (1938-41).
** General Counsel, Americans for Effective Law Enforcement; Senior Counsel,
Northwestern University Traffic Institute.
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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scribed warning regarding the right to a lawyer was not based
upon the sixth amendment provision that "[i] n all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the assis-
tance of counsel for his defense." (emphasis added). Rather, the
inclusion'of the right to a lawyer as part of the Miranda warnings
was only to supplement the fifth amendment provision that "No
person . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a wit-
ness against himself." (emphasis added).
The frequency with which Miranda issue cases have surfaced in
the appellate court reports on the federal as well as state level,
prompted the authors and their colleagues at Americans for Effec-
tive Law Enforcement, Inc. to arrange for a survey to be con-
ducted for the purpose of permitting some assessment to be made
of the amount of time and effort that was being expended by the
various appellate courts in disposing of Miranda issue cases.2 The
basic interest of the survey was to determine whether Miranda is
worth the cost in court time and effort, particularly in view of the
fact the Supreme Court's mandate was only a prophylactic rule
for reducing the likelihood of a violation of the self-incrimination
privilege, rather than a substantive rule to safeguard against the
risk of false confessions being used as evidence in criminal
prosecutions. 3
A cursory view of the numerous federal and state Miranda is-
sue cases decided by the various appellate courts readily revealed
the enormity of a nation-wide survey, if one were to be attempted.
Moreover, it probably would be no more revealing than a sample
survey. It was decided, therefore, that a survey would be made of
the Miranda issue decisions rendered from the date of that deci-
sion in 1966 through 1986 by: a) the Supreme Court of the
United States; b) the federal circuit courts of appeal; and c) the
intermediate appellate courts of California. 4 In addition to ascer-
2. AELE is a national not-for-profit, tax exempt educational organization, estab-
lished in 1966 (prior to Miranda). Its primary purposes are (1) to assist law enforcement
by conducting legal training programs for upper level personnel, and providing publications
and consultations for the law enforcement community regarding the legal aspects of police
procedures and activities, and (2) to file "friend of the court" briefs in the United States
Supreme Court and lower appellate courts in support of vital police practices supportable
by constitutional principles. To date, eighty one briefs have been filed in the United States
Supreme Court alone. AELE's Executive Director is Wayne W. Schmidt who supervises
the brief writing program as well as the general operations of AELE.
3. For a concise explanation of the prophylactic rule concept in the Miranda con-
text, see Grano, Prophylactic Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Le-
gitinacy, 80 Nw. U.L. REv. 100, 106-11 (1986). See also Grano, Selling the Idea to Tell
the Truth: The Professional Interrogator and Modern Criminal Law, 84 MICH. L. REv.
662 (1986).
4. The survey was made possible by the Cranston and Catherine Spray Trust.
Under its terms, the annual income may be used to provide stipends to one or more stu-
[Vol. 24
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taining the number of cases, a count was made of the approximate
number of words contained in the opinions.
In our report on the results of the survey, the authors do not
profess that the results are meaningful in a comparative statistical
sense. In other words, no effort was made to compare the number
of Miranda issue cases with cases involving confession voluntari-
ness per se, or with any other group or groups of criminal cases
decided upon either constitutional grounds or prophylactic rules.
Our only objective was to demonstrate, without resort to compari-
sons, that a "considerable" amount of court time and effort has
been expended, not only upon Miranda itself, but also upon its
progeny ever since that decision in 1966.
I. SAMPLE OF THE SURVEY
Before presenting a detailed summary of the survey results, we
submit, for illustrative purposes, the brief facts and figures on
three recent cases, one each from the Supreme Court, a United
States Circuit Court of Appeals, and a California Appellate
Court:
A. Oregon v. Elstad5
While being questioned in his home by a police officer who had
a warrant for his arrest on a burglary charge, the defendant made
an incriminating statement without having received the Miranda
warnings. He was also unaware of the warrant. Later at the police
station, the warnings were given and the defendant made a full
confession. His conviction was reversed by the Oregon Court of
Appeals upon a finding that there was an insufficient break in the
events between the initial unwarned statement and the confession
obtained in the police station. On certiorari, the United States Su-
preme Court, six to three, reversed the Oregon court, and ruled
that the initial uncoerced questioning without the warnings did
not disable the defendant from subsequently waving his rights af-
ter the warnings were administered to him.
The various opinions in Elstad, all devoted to the Miranda is-
dents of Northwestern University School of Law "to conduct research in support of effec-
tive law enforcement". The student primarily responsible for this particular survey and
report was Matthew L. Mahoney, class of 1988, to whom the authors are deeply grateful
for his very able assistance. We are also grateful to a number of other students who as-
sisted us in the early stages of the survey.
In addition to our gratitude for student assistance on the survey, we also express our
appreciation to Lawrence C. Marshall, Assistant Professor of Law at Northwestern, for
examining our original manuscript and offering his criticisms and suggestions. We relieve
him, however, of any responsibility for the conclusions and views expressed in this paper.
5. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
1988]
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sue, consumed 72 printed pages, 25,000 words, and contained ci-
tations to 149 cases.
B. Bradburn v. McCotter6
A habeas corpus petitioner's statement that he made after a
Nevada arrest expressing an interest in waiting until he arrived in
Texas to get a court appointed lawyer did not amount to even an
equivocal request for counsel in Nevada. This case also dealt with
a failure to exhaust state remedies.
Of the 3.5 pages in the opinion, 2.5 were devoted to the Mi-
randa issue. The total number of words was 2,220, of which 1,680
pertained to Miranda.
C. People v. Prysock
Upon arrest for a 1978 murder, the defendant received Mi-
randa warnings which his counsel argued were inadequate, thus
rendering the defendant's subsequent confessions inadmissable as
evidence. The suppression motion was denied, and upon trial the
defendant was convicted. Upon appeal, a California appellate
court reversed. The California Supreme Court, five to two, denied
review. Upon a grant of certiorari, the United States Supreme
Court reversed, six to three, and established the principle that the
warnings need not be a "a virtual incantation of the precise lan-
guage contained in Miranda."8
The defendant was retried and again convicted. The conviction
was affirmed by the same appellate court that had reversed the
original conviction. It held, two to one, that the warnings met the
requirements prescribed by the United States Supreme Court and
that the confession was also a voluntary one. The case ended with
a four to three denial of review by the California Supreme Court.
In the final appellate court opinions in Prysock, the Miranda
issue consumed 15.5 pages and 8,500 words out of a respective
total of 29.5 and 16,000.
II. SUMMARY OF SURVEY RESULTS
In Miranda v. Arizona itself, the majority and minority opin-
ions consisted of 106 pages and approximately 30,000 words.
From 1966 through 1986, substantive Miranda issues were con-
sidered in forty-four cases, for a total of 606 printed pages in the
6. 786 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1986).
7. 127 Cal. App. 3d 972, 180 Cal. Rptr. 15 (1982).
8. 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
[Vol. 24
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official United States reports, consisting of approximately 160,000
words. The government prevailed in thirty-one of the cases and
the contesting party in thirteen.
(Since 1986 through June 1987, the Supreme Court rendered
three additional Miranda decisions, in which the government pre-
vailed in all of them. The opinions in the three new cases cover
forty-six pages and contain approximately 12,000 words. The total
number of cases, therefore, exclusive of Miranda itself, amounts
to forty-seven, with 652 pages and 172,000 words.) 9
It was once thought that after the initial impact of Miranda,
the various issues that might arise from it would soon be resolved
by the Supreme Court in other cases. The prediction was that
there would be an eventual diminution of litigation over Mi-
randa's requirements not only in the Supreme Court, but also in
lower federal appellate courts, and in the state appellate courts as
well. As reasonable as that assumption may have been, the facts
are to the contrary. The accompanying charts, Appendices 110 and
2"1 demonstrate that the number of Miranda issue cases decided
by the Supreme Court has actually increased during the twenty
year period since its inception, along with substantial increases in
the number of pages and words in the opinions disposing of them.
In the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals, Miranda issues
were discussed in 980 cases decided during the period 1966-1986.
The opinions consisted of 2,155 pages and approximately
1,200,000 words. The prosecution prevailed in 803 cases, the de-
fense in 177.12
The California courts of appeal decided 363 cases from 1966
through 1986, for a total of 905 pages and approximately 450,000
words, dealing solely with substantive Miranda issues.13 The pros-
ecution prevailed in 281 cases, the defense in 82.
III. COMMENTARY
No attempt was made, nor did we think it was even possible, to
ascertain the extent to which Miranda issues have encroached
9. For the count of the number of pages devoted to Supreme Court opinions the
researchers used the official United States Reports, except with respect to the most recent
cases that were unavailable in the official reports. For those the Lawyers' Edition decisions
were used, with allowance made for the fact that its double column pages were approxi-
mately 1.6 times less than those in the United States Report.
10. See infra Appendix I at 200.
11. See infra Appendix II at 200.
12. The federal appellate court cases that were surveyed were those appearing in the
federal reporter. Not included in the survey, therefore, are the decisions of the Court of
Appeal for the District of Columbia that appear in the Atlantic Reporter.
13. The California Reporter was the source for the page count.
1988]
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upon the time and efforts of the trial courts on either the federal
or state level. We submit that the results of any such survey, if
feasible, would have produced staggering figures, especially in
view of the fact that defense counsel in confessions cases almost
invariably inject the Miranda element into their objections to the
admissibility of confessions. Furthermore, the number of appellate
court cases is some indication, of course, of what has been occur-
ring in the trial courts.
As is true with regard to the trial court expenditure of time and
effort, there is no way by which the overall monetary costs pro-
duced by Miranda could be assessed. Without doubt, however,
such costs must be very substantial.
A. An Example of the Judicial Time and Effort Devoted to
Miranda
An excellent, though certainly not a rare illustration of the ex-
tent of judicial time and effort devoted to Miranda issues is the
California case of People v. Beheler,14 decided by its fifth district
appellate court in December 1982. Beheler involved the question
as to whether the confessor to participation in a 1980 attempted
robbery-murder was in "custody" at the time he made his initial
statements about the circumstances of the killing, during which
three other young men were present.
Shortly after the crime, the defendant had a neighbor telephone
the police to report the killing. Upon police arrival at the neigh-
bor's home, the defendant stated that he wanted to discuss "the
circumstances surrounding the shooting." He acknowledged being
present, but stated that his stepbrother shot the victim for "no
apparent reason." Defendant further stated that the pistol used in
the shooting had been hidden by his companions in defendant's
backyard (where it was found later). Defendant was asked if he
had any objection to going to the police station, and he was told
that he was not under arrest. He agreed to go "so that the investi-
gation could be brought to a conclusion as soon as possible."
Without being advised of Miranda rights, the defendant was
interviewed for less than thirty minutes at the police station, after
which he was permitted to return home. Five days later, however,
he was arrested. He then received the warnings of his rights,
which he waived. Upon questioning, he admitted going with his
stepbrother and two other young men to the place where the kill-
ing occurred. Their mission, he stated, was to rob a narcotics ped-
14. This case is unreported officially. See infra notes 15 and 16 and accompanying
[Vol. 24
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dler at gunpoint.
At the defendant's trial for aiding and abetting first degree
murder, the trial court admitted into evidence all of the defend-
ant's statements, including the initial ones made in his neighbor's
home prior to his subsequent arrest. He was convicted, but the
California appellate court reversed, holding that the prosecution
had not met its burden of establishing that the defendant was not
in custody during the initial interview.
By a four to three margin the California Supreme Court denied
review. 15 The state filed a thirty-four page petition for certiorari to
the United States Supreme Court. Appended to the brief was the
thirty-eight printed page opinion of the California appellate court,
although that opinion, under a California procedure, had been or-
dered "not to be published in official reports."' 6 The United States
Supreme Court, in a four page majority opinion, summarily re-
versed the California appellate court.' Three Justices dissented,
and in a two page opinion they expressed the view that the Court
should receive briefs or oral arguments on the merits of the cases.
They were persuaded by the fact that the California appellate
court had written a thirty-eight page opinion, "most of which was
devoted to an analysis of the question whether, under all the rele-
vant facts, the respondent was in 'custody'."
Although there is no way to accurately assess the cost of time
and effort expended in the Beheler case, it is reasonable to pre-
sume the cost assessment would be a substantial one, and particu-
larly so if the United States Supreme Court had ordered a review
of briefs or oral arguments.
B. Confusion Regarding Miranda
Following are brief reports of two cases that illustrate the con-
siderable confusion over Miranda issues within the judiciary as
well as among law enforcement personnel, which confusion has an
impact, of course, upon the ultimate cost factor which we are
discussing.
United States v. Mesa,'8 decided by the Third Circuit Court of
15. See note in People v. Beheler, 200 Cal. Rptr. 195 (Cal. App. 5th Dist. 1984)
which upheld the defendant's conviction upon a retrial, with the sentence reduced to
manslaughter.
16. Section 976 of the California Civil Code and Criminal Rules provides for several
situations in which no opinions of the appellate courts are to be published in the state's
official reports. Among them are decisions that do not establish a new rule of law or apply
an existing rule to a set of facts significantly different from the facts in already published
opinions.
17. 463 U.S. 1121 (1983).
18. 638 F.2d 582 (3d Cir. 1980).
19881
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Appeals in 1980, involved the twin issues of "custody" and "inter-
rogation" within the meaning of Miranda's mandate. The defend-
ant had been a fugitive on an arrest warrant for the shooting of
his daughter and his common law wife. He was located by the
FBI in a motel room where he had barricaded himself. An FBI
agent called to him repeatedly on a bullhorn, urging him to come
out. He refused, but agreed to talk on a mobile phone to an FBI
negotiator. Their conversation was recorded and in it the suspect
made some incriminating statements, after which he peacefully
surrendered. A United States district court suppressed the state-
ments on the ground that they were made in a custodial situation,
without the suspect having received the Miranda warnings. On
appeal the circuit court reversed in a two to one decision. The
chief judge concluded that "where an armed suspect who possibly
has hostages barricades himself away from the police, he is not in
custody [within] the meaning of the Miranda rule." Another
judge concluded that the FBI agent's conversation with the sus-
pect did not constitute interrogation, and for that reason the warn-
ings were not required. The third judge dissented because he con-
cluded that there was both custody and interrogation, thus
necessitating the warnings.
If, as in Mesa, three federal appellate court judges come to
three different conclusions as to whether "interrogation" and
"custody" existed in a specific case situation, is it not unreasona-
ble to expect law enforcement officers to make the required ap-
praisals under conditions where they do not have the luxuries of
time for deliberation or the availability of library facilities and the
skill to use them?
The next and last case illustration involved the Miranda re-
quirement of "waiver" following the issuance of the warnings. In
People v. Braeseke,1" the defendant, while in custody of the Oak-
land, California police as a suspect in a triple murder, received the
Miranda warnings and waived his rights. However, upon being
confronted with some incriminating physical evidence, he refused
to talk without an attorney being present. Respectful of Miranda's
mandate, the California police ceased their questioning of him.
They then proceeded to book him for the crime. After he had been
questioned as to his name, address, date of birth, and the name of
next of kin, he asked one of the investigating officers if he could
speak "off the record." The officer agreed. Braeseke soon con-
fessed the crime and also revealed the location of the rifle used in
the killings.
19. 602 P.2d 384, 159 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1979).
[Vol. 24
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Upon appeal from Breaseke's conviction, the California Su-
preme Court, in a 1979 decision, held five to four, that the "off
the record" request did not constitute a waiver of his previously
asserted right to remain silent. The confession and the evidence
derived from it (the rifle) were ruled inadmissible. The prosecu-
tion filed a petition for certiorari in the United States Supreme
Court. After a grant of the petition, the case was remanded to the
California Supreme Court "to consider whether its judgment was
based on federal or state grounds, or both." 20 The California Su-
preme Court certified that its judgment was "based upon Miranda
v. Arizona and the fifth amendment to the United States Consti-
tution."21 Further review was denied by the United States Su-
preme Court.2
Braeske was retried and convicted upon evidence obtained (af-
ter some initial resistance from a TV network) of incriminating
statements Braeseke made while in jail after his first conviction
during an interview with Mike Wallace on CBS's "60 Minutes"
TV program. Braeseke's unsuccessful defense at his second trial
was the influence of an hallucinogenic drug ("angel dust") at the
time of the killings.
C. Considering the Future of Miranda
In considering the future of Miranda's mandate, the following
factors are deserving of special consideration:
1. The Miranda warnings are not constitutionally required. An
interrogation without them does not violate the fifth amendment's
prohibition against compelling a person to incriminate himself.
This was the holding of over thirty state supreme courts and a
federal circuit court prior to Miranda."
The Supreme Court, itself, in several cases subsequent to Mi-
randa, clearly evidenced the fact that the decision was a prophy-
lactic underpinning of the fifth amendment self-incrimination
privilege rather that a constitutionally required set of rules. For
instance, in Harris v. New York, a Miranda-flawed confession was
20. 466 U.S. 932 (1980).
21. 618 P.2d 149, 168 Cal. Rptr. 603 (1980).
22. 451 U.S. 1021 (1981).
It is of interest to note that the Supreme Court has abandoned the practice of remand to
determine whether a state case was decided upon either state or federal grounds. The
Court now automatically assumes that the basis was a federal one whenever the case cites
a federal decision or the federal Constitution, unless there is a clear statement in the opin-
ion to the contrary. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983).
23. The citations to the cases are in F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 169-70 (2d ed. 1967).
1988]
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24declared usable for impeachment purposes, and in Michigan v.
Tucker, the Court held that derivative use could be made of a
Miranda invalid statement that led to evidence of the suspect's
guilt.25 The decisions in those cases and others of a similar nature
would not be sustainable if the requirements of Miranda were
constitutionally mandated."6
2. A further indication of the lack of a constitutional basis for
Miranda is the fact that in the majority opinion itself, the Court
invited Congress and the state legislatures to devise some suitable
alternative to Miranda, although the Court was not very explicit
as to what would be acceptable to it.27 In accordance with the
perceived invitation, Congress in the 1968 Omnibus Crime Bill
provided an alternative, and so did the Arizona legislature in
1969. Essentially this legislation declared that voluntariness was
the test of confession admissibility, but that in determining the
issue of voluntariness, consideration should be given to whether
the suspect had been advised of his right to silence and to a law-
yer. However, the presence or absence of those factors would not
be conclusive with respect to voluntariness.
No case has been presented to the Supreme Court, or to any
other court of review, that would test the validity of either the
congressional or Arizona enactment. 28 On a number of occasions,
and as subsequently reiterated, one of the authors of this paper
has suggested that a suitable case should be presented to the Su-
preme Court for review of either the federal or state provision.
3. The issuance of the Miranda warnings offers encouragement
to many criminal offenders to refuse to talk. Although no figures
are available--or indeed, even ascertainable-to substantiate that
statement, a common sense case illustration should render ade-
quate support. A person who has committed a criminal act would
be taking a very risky chance if he declines the invitation to re-
main silent and to request a lawyer. If he makes the kind of
waiver the Supreme Court prescribed-a "knowing and intelli-
gent" one-and submits to an interrogation, the conclusion seems
24, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). A decision to the same effect is Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S.
714 (1975).
25, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
26, One of the cases discussed earlier in this paper, Oregon v. Elstad, may also be
considered supportive of the same conclusion. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966). Also consider the following: "It is impossible for us to
foresee the potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by
Congress or the States in the exercise of their creative rule-making capacities. Therefore,
we cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any particular solu-
tion for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process as it is presently conducted."
id. at 467.
28. But see United States v. Crocker, 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
[Vol. 24
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inescapable that he is not intelligent. Rarely will there be any
gain; he will surely incur the risk of a damaging admission, or
even a full confession, and a consequent criminal charge and pos-
sible conviction.
Prior to Miranda, if a suspect, either custodial or non-custodial,
said he did not want to talk, or that he wanted a lawyer, a compe-
tent interrogator could frequently persuade him to talk anyway,
and, if guilty, to also confess. Miranda resulted in a nullification
of this previous legally permissible interrogation tactic for seeking
to ascertain evidence of guilt-or, on occasions, the establishment
of the suspect's innocence (as where, for instance, he reveals to
the interrogator a provable alibi).29
4. Despite the requirements for warnings by interrogators re-
garding the fifth amendment privilege, no warnings are required
under the fourth amendment as a condition to the consensual
search of a person or his possessions. There is an incongruity here,
because the fourth amendment specifically prohibits unreasonable
searches whereas the fifth amendment contains no prohibition
against non-compulsory interrogations.
In a 1973 Supreme Court search and seizure case, the majority
opinion stated that "it would be thoroughly impractical to impose
on the normal consent search the detailed requirements of an ef-
fective warning," and that "[c]onsent searches are part of the
standard investigatory techniques of law enforcement agencies." 30
The same may be said of the interrogation process.
Although this search and seizure case did not involve a custo-
dial suspect, in a later case the Supreme Court held that even
when a suspect is in custody, no warning need precede a consen-
sual search;3 ' and other courts have applied that rule with regard
to suspects in police station custody. 2
5. There is a gross misconception, generated and perpetuated by
fiction writers, movies, and television, that if criminal investigators
carefully examine a crime scene, they will almost always find a
clue that will lead them to the offender; and that, furthermore,
once the criminal is located, he will shunt aside his self-preserva-
tion instinct and readily confess or otherwise reveal guilt, as by
attempting to escape. This however, is pure fiction. As a matter of
fact, the art and science of criminal investigation has not yet de-
29. This technique was described in F. INBAU & J. REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION
AND CONFESSIONS 111-12 (1st ed. 1962). In the succeeding edition, published after Mi-
randa in 1967, it had to be omitted, of course.
30. Schneckloth v. Bustamente, 412 U.S. 218, 232 (1973).
31. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
32. Among the cases are United States v. Heimforth, 493 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1974);
United States v. De Marco, 488 F.2d 828 (2d Cir. 1973).
19881
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veloped to a point where the search for and the examination of
physical evidence will always, or even in most cases, reveal a clue
to the identity of the perpetrator or provide the necessary legal
proof of guilt. In criminal investigations, even of the most efficient
type, there are many, many instances where physical clues are en-
tirely absent, and the only approach to a possible solution of the
crime is the interrogation of the criminal suspect himself, as well
as of others who may possess significant information. 3
6. Once a lawyer enters upon an interrogation scene, he will
very rarely do anything more than instruct his client to keep his
mouth shut. As the late Supreme Court Justice Jackson stated in
a 1948 case, "[t]o bring in a lawyer means a real peril to the
solution of the crime . . . Any lawyer worth his salt will tell the
suspect . . . to make no statement to police under any
circumstances. 3 4
7. The majority opinion in Miranda attributes to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation a practice consistent with what the Court
mandated in that case for all police interrogators. It suggested
that "the practice of the FBI can readily be emulated by state and
local law enforcement agencies."3 5 Two basic flaws are present in
that conclusion. First, as Justice Harlan, one of the four dissenting
Justices, pointed out, the FBI's interrogation practices were con-
siderably short of Miranda's formalistic rules: "For example,
there is no indication that FBI agents must obtain an affirmative
'waiver' before they pursue their questioning. Nor is it clear that
one invoking his right to silence may not be prevailed upon to
change his mind. And the warning as to appointed counsel appar-
ently indicates only that one will be assigned by the judge when
the suspect appears before him . . .3
Second, again as stated by Justice Harlan, "[t]here is some ba-
sis for believing that the staple of FBI criminal work differs im-
portantly from much crime within the ken of local police. The
skill and resources of the FBI may also be unusual."3" Unques-
tionably, the national police responsibilities and case problems are
vastly different from those that confront the state and local police,
and particularly the police in large urban areas with their multitu-
dinous volume of burglaries, robberies, rapes, murders, and other
types of personal and property offenses. Offenses of that nature do
33. For an extensive discussion of the practical necessity for interrogations in the
police investigative process, see the Introduction to F. INBAU, J. REID, & J. BUCKLEY,
CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS (3d ed. 1986).
34. Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1948).
35. 384 U.S. at 486.
36. Id. at 521.
37. Id. at 521 n.19.
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not lend themselves to solution by investigative procedures alone,
even when supplemented by the most sophisticated scientific aids;
there is the indispensable need in a high proportion of such crimes
for the interrogation of persons suspected of committing them.
8. The diminution of the use of brutality, threats of brutality,
and other unconscionable police interrogation practices is some-
times attributed to the advent of Miranda. According to some of
the worshipers at the shrine of Miranda, the rules laid down in
that case have actually improved police practices by impelling po-
lice resort to acceptable investigative procedures, and especially
those that utilize scientific methods for the procurement of evi-
dence leading to the perpetrator and eventually to a successful
prosecution. Miranda is undeserving of that tribute. As already
stated, scientific methods, for a number of reasons, are only appli-
cable to a small proportion of criminal offenses, and there are se-
vere practical limitations even upon conventional investigative pro-
cedures when used alone, without the aid of interrogation
opportunities.
Prior to Miranda, the movement was under way to improve the
quality of police interrogation practices, and, most certainly,
shunting aside the earlier "third degree" device. Moreover, there
was, and continued increasingly to be the utilization of, or an-
nounced intention to invoke civil rights statutes to prosecute police
who indulge in practices of that nature.38 That was a development
totally unrelated to the Miranda mandate.
9. It is an undeniable fact that a very high proportion of crimi-
nal offenders are from the ranks of the poor, the uneducated, or
the unintelligent. Many of them are entitled to compassion and to
whatever rehabilitation society has to offer. The time to display
that compassion, however, is after a determination has been made
as to whether the suspect with such an unfortunate background
actually committed the criminal offense for which he is suspected.
He is hardly a fit subject for rehabilitation if his unlawful conduct
is undetected, or if he has been unwilling to admit committing
such conduct. He or she is hardly amenable to rehabilitation as
long as there is a denial of the wrongdoing; and Miranda is a
roadblock to admissions.
A criminal offender who has "beaten the rap" because of the
benefit bestowed upon him by Miranda is bound to have a less-
ened respect, or even contempt, for the legal system that permits
such an escape chute. This, too, we suggest has a psychological
38. The federal criminal action statutes are 18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242 (1981); the civil
action one is 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1981). For an example of a state statute see I1l. Rv. Stat.,
Ch. 38, § 12-17.
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disadvantage with respect to attempts at rehabilitation.
One further point with regard to the underlying social philoso-
phy of Miranda: a very high percentage of the victims of crime
are from the ranks of the poor, the uneducated, or the unintelli-
gent. It is of no comfort to them to be told by the police investiga-
tors that they had been handicapped in their efforts because of
court rulings requiring warnings to arrested suspects of their
rights to silence and to a lawyer-warnings that are required so as
to equalize humanity; in other words, to even things out as regards
the poor and the rich, the uneducated and the educated, the unin-
telligent and the intelligent. This is not likely to produce tears in
the eyes of victims who have been raped or robbed, or whose home
has been burglarized while they were away at work earning a liv-
ing. Such a reaction is also not to be expected when the victims
are subsequently told that their offenders had been brought to
trial but were acquitted, or had their convictions reversed, because
they were either not warned of those rights or that the rights were
not properly administered.
10. An additional and seldom mentioned factor of relevance to
the issue as to whether Miranda should be abandoned is the atti-
tude of some prosecuting attorneys who must rely heavily upon a
confession as an element in their proof of guilt. In such instances
they realize that their probability of success is highly enhanced if
they can place a law enforcement officer on the witness stand to
recite the ritual of Miranda warnings that were issued to the de-
fendant while a suspect, coupled with the waiver he made of them.
To a prosecutor, therefore, Miranda may serve as a valuable
prosecutorial tool. What is overlooked or ignored, however, are the
countless number of cases that never reach the prosecutorial stage
because of the acceptance by suspects of the invitation to remain
silent or to have a lawyer present during the interrogation. Then,
too, there are the occasions when a prosecutor decides not to use a
confession as evidence because of his perception, at times un-
founded, that the police failed to give the proper warnings or else
neglected to even give them because of a possible misjudgment by
the police that they were not required under the particular case
circumstances.
Irrespective of whether the number of Miranda issue cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court is considered to be relatively "many"
or relatively "few," the stark fact remains that the Court has de-
cided forty-seven Miranda cases, exclusive of the original decision.
The opinions in those cases consumed 652 printed pages in the
official court reports, and they totaled approximately 172,000
[Vol. 24
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/10
MIRANDA
words. Also, in one 1985 case alone, Oregon v. Elstad,39 the opin-
ions contained references to 149 cases. All of this represents a
considerable burden, especially when consideration is given to the
research required into the various issues presented, the conference
time of the Justices, their own independent contemplations, and
the preparation and finalization of the opinions to be published.
The Court should extricate itself from this self-inflicted burden of
time and effort, which could be better devoted to cases involving
matters of far greater importance than the prophylactic rules of
Miranda's mandate. An auxiliary benefit would be an end to the
mischief created by Miranda for the police and prosecutors as
well as for the many trial and appellate courts.40
There should be no further delay in remedial action by the Su-
preme Court. As earlier indicated, an appropriate circumstance
would be a case pertaining to the constitutional validity of the rel-
evant provision of the 1968 Congressional Omnibus Crime Act or
its 1969 Arizona counterpart. 4' Direct action toward Miranda's
demise would be far preferable to the slower "erosion" process
about which a few of the Justices have complained. The erosion
route would only perpetuate further erosion of valuable court time
and effort.
39. 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
40. For examples of the mischief, see among other cases, the case of John W. Hink-
ley, Jr., the attempted assassin of President Reagan, discussed in Inbau, Over-Reac-
lion-The Mischief of Miranda v. Arizona, 73 J.C.L. & CRIm. 797, 809 (1982), repub-
lished in revised form, in THE PROSECUTOR (Winter 1985 issue, at p.7).
41. These two enactments were discussed supra at 194. They are 18 U.S.C. § 3501
(1969) and ARIz. REv. STAT. § 13-3988 (1978).
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Appendix #1
Number of Supreme Court Cases on Miranda Issues
in the United States Reporter During 1966-1986
Number of
Cases:
5
4
3
2
YEAR: 67 68 69 70 71 7273 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
Appendix #2
Number of Pages in the Supreme Court's Miranda Issue Cases
in the United States Reporter During 1966-1986
Number
of pages:
; 0105
100
95
90
85
80
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
35
30
25
20
is
10
5
YEAR: 67 68 69 70 7172 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86
16
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 10
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/10
